This paper presents two new improved attacks on the KMOV cryptosystem. KMOV is an encryption algorithm based on elliptic curves over the ring ZN where N = pq is a product of two large primes of equal bit size. The first attack uses the properties of the convergents of the continued fraction expansion of a specific value derived from the KMOV public key. The second attack is based on Coppersmith's method for finding small solutions of a multivariate polynomial modular equation. Both attacks improve the existing attacks on the KMOV cryptosystem.
Introduction
The RSA cryptosystem [21] , invented in 1978 by Rivest, Shamir and Adleman, is the most widely used cryptosystem. The main parameters in RSA are two integers, the RSA modulus N = pq where p and q are large prime numbers, and the public exponent e, which is an integer satisfying gcd(e, (p − 1)(q − 1)) = 1. The private exponent is the integer d satisfying ed ≡ 1 (mod (p − 1)(q − 1)). In many implementations, the private exponent d is required to be small to ease decryption and signature. Unfortunately, this scenario is dangerous and can be used to break the system [3, 6] . In 1990, Wiener [25, 24] presented an attack to break the RSA system if the private exponent d satisfies d < 1 4 √ 18 N 1 4 . Since then, Wiener's bound has been extended in many situations, mainly by Boneh and Durfee [2] to d < N 0.292 .
In 1985, Miller [17] and Koblitz [13] independently proposed to use elliptic curves in cryptography. Since then, many cryptosystems have been proposed based on elliptic curves. In the direction of RSA, Koyama, Maurer, Okamoto and Vanstone [14] proposed a cryptosystem, called KMOV, based on the elliptic curve E N (0, b) where N = pq is an RSA modulus and E N (0, b) is the set of solutions of the modular equation y 2 ≡ x 3 + b (mod N ), together with the point at infinity, denoted O. When the prime factors p and q are such that p ≡ q ≡ 2 (mod 3), then any point P ∈ E N (0, b) satisfies (p + 1)(q + 1)P = O. In KMOV, the public key is a pair (N, e) where N = pq with two prime integers satisfying p ≡ q ≡ 2 (mod 3) and e is an integer satisfying gcd(e, (p + 1)(q + 1)) = 1. The decryption exponent is the integer d such that ed ≡ 1 (mod (p + 1)(q + 1)).
Notice that the modular equation ed ≡ 1 (mod (p+1)(q +1)) is equivalent to the integer key equation ed−k(p+1)(q +1) = 1. In 1995, Pinch [20] used the key equation and extended Wiener's attack to KMOV. He showed that one can factor the modulus N = pq if d < 1 3 N 1 4 . In [11] , Ibrahimpasic extended the attack of Pinch by a few bits using an exhaustive search. Both attacks use the convergents of the continued fraction expansion of e N . In [18] , Nitaj considered the generalized equation eu − (p + 1)(q + 1)v = w and showed that one can factor the modulus N = pq if the parameters u, v, w satisfy some specific conditions, especially if uv <
The method combines the continued fraction algorithm [4, 7] and Coppersmith's method [8] for solving univariate modular equations.
In this paper, we extend the former attacks on KMOV. In the first attack we consider the KMOV key equation ed − k(p + 1)(q + 1) = 1 and instead of using the convergents of e N , we use the convergents of e N +1+ 1+ 3
. As a consequence, we show that one can factor the modulus N = pq if the private
√ e . This bound improves the former bound d < 1 3 N 1 4 , especially when the public exponent e is significantly smaller then N . In the second attack we consider the generalized key equation eu−(p+1)(q + 1)v = w and transform it to the modular polynomial equation v(p+q +1)+N v + w ≡ 0 (mod e). We consider the polynomial f (x, y, z) = xy + N x + z and apply Coppersmith's method to find the small solutions of the modular polynomial equation f (x, y, z) ≡ 0 (mod e). When e = N β , u < N δ and |w| < N γ , if
where ε is a small constant, then Coppersmith's method enables us to find p + q + 1, which combined with N = pq gives p and q. We note that in the standard situation of a KMOV instance with e ≈ N and eu − (p + 1)(q + 1)v = 1, our new bound is δ < 0.284 which is much larger than the existing bounds. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we give some preliminaries on Coppersmith's method, continued fractions, elliptic curves and recall the KMOV cryptosystem. In Section 3, we present our first attack on KMOV based on continued fractions. In Section 4, we present our second attack on KMOV which is based on Coppersmith's method. We conclude the paper in Section 5.
Preliminaries
In this section, we give some preliminaries on Coppersmith's methods for solving modular polynomial equations, continued fractions and elliptic elliptic curves. For completeness, we recall the KMOV cryptosystem.
Coppersmith's method
One of the difficult problems in algebra is to solve modular polynomial equations of the form
where f (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ∈ Z[x 1 , . . . , x n ] is multivariate polynomial. In 1996, Coppersmith [8] introduced a rigorous method for finding the small solutions of the univariate polynomial equation f (x) ≡ 0 (mod e) and the small roots of the bivariate polynomial equation f (x, y) = 0. Coppersmith's method is based on lattice reduction and is useful in cryptography, especially for attacking the RSA cryptosystem (see [16, 5, 1, 19] ). Since then, numerous variants of Coppersmith's method have been presented for multivariate polynomial equations assuming certain hypothesis. The following result of Howgrave-Graham [10] is useful for solving the polynomial equations. h (x 0 , y 0 , z 0 ) ≡ 0 (mod e m ) and
where |x 0 | < X, |y 0 | < Y , |z 0 | < Z. Then h (x 0 , y 0 , z 0 ) = 0 holds over the integers.
For a multivariate polynomial modular equation f (x, y, z) ≡ 0 (mod e), the idea in Coppersmith's method is to build certain modular polynomials equations h(x, y, z) ≡ 0 (mod e m ) sharing the modular solution (x 0 , y 0 , z 0 ). These polynomials are generally built by applying Jochemz-May [12] method and applying lattice reduction techniques such as the LLL algorithm [15] . The LLL algorithm acts on lattices and the following result is useful (see [15, 16, 12] ).
Theorem 2 (LLL). Let L be a lattice spanned by a basis (u 1 , . . . , u ω ), then the LLL algorithm produces a new basis
To find the root (x 0 , y 0 , z 0 ), we use a system with three polynomial equations h i (x, y, z) = 0, i = 1, 2, 3. By using Gröbner basis computation or resultant techniques, the system can be solved under the following widely believed assumption.
Assumption 1
The polynomials h 1 , h 2 , h 3 ∈ Z[x, y, z] that are derived from the reduced basis of the lattice in Coppersmith's method are algebraically independent.
Continued fractions
Let ξ = 0 be real number. The continued fraction expansion of ξ is an expression of the form ξ = a 0 + 1
where a 0 is an integer and for i ≥ 1, a i is a positive integer. The integers a i , i ≥ 0 are the partial quotients of the continued fraction expansion. The process to compute the integers a i for i ≥ 0 is the continued fraction algorithm. The starting term is x 0 = ξ and for i ≥ 0,
When the continued fraction expansion is used with the first k + 1 partial quotients, the fraction is a convergent. The following method is very useful for computing the convergents of ξ.
Theorem 3. The k th convergent can be determined as [a 0 , . . . , a k ] = p k q k , where the sequences {p n } and {q n } are specified as follows 3 : p −2 = 0, p −1 = 1, p n = a n p n−1 + p n−2 , ∀n ≥ 0, q −2 = 1, q −1 = 0, q n = a n q n−1 + q n−2 , ∀n ≥ 0.
There are many properties related to the theory of continued fractions. One of the most important results is Legendre's Theorem (see Theorem 184 of [9] ). 
then a b is a convergent of the continued fraction of ξ. Note that computing a convergent a b of ξ with the continued fraction algorithm is done in polynomial time in log(b).
Elliptic curves
Let p ≥ 5 be a prime number and a and b two integers satisfying 4a
together with a point O, called the point at infinity. If P 1 = (x 1 , y 1 ) and P 2 = (x 2 , y 2 ) are two points, then one have the following properties.
-
With the former addition law, the set (1) together with the point at infinity. According to a famous Theorem of Hasse (see [23] ,
For specific values of p, #E p (a, b) can be explicitly computed as for p ≡ 2 (mod 3) (see [22] ).
Since #E p (a, b) is the order of the group E p (0, b) for the addition law, then #E p (a, b) · P = O for any point P ∈ E p (a, b). When p ≡ 2 (mod 3), then for any point P ∈, we have (p + 1)P = O. When N is a composite square free integer and a and b are integers satisfying 4a 3 + 27b 2 ≡ 0 (mod p), one can define an elliptic curve E N (a, b) over the ring Z/N Z by the equation
together with a point O at infinity. An addition law can be defined over E N (a, b) by using the same rules as the addition law on E p (a, b) by replacing modulo p by modulo N . When the division by x 2 −x 1 is not possible, this means that gcd(
If N = pq is an RSA modulus, this is equivalent to factoring N . Since the integer factorization problem is very hard, especially for RSA moduli, then the scenario that the addition does not exist is unlikely to happen. By the Chinese remainder theorem, every point P = (x, y) ∈ E N (a, b) is uniquely represented by a pair of
). It follows that for p ≡ q ≡ 2 (mod 3) and for any point P ∈ E N (0, b), we have
The KMOV Cryptosystem
In 1991, Koyama, Maurer, Okamoto and Vanstone proposed a cryptosystem, called KMOV, based on the elliptic curve E N (0, b) where N = pq is an RSA modulus. The scheme works as follows.
-KMOV Key Generation algorithm. 1. Choose two distinct prime numbers p and q of similar bit-length with p ≡ q ≡ 2 (mod 3). 2. Compute N = pq. 3 . Choose e such that gcd(e, (p + 1)(q + 1)) = 1. 4. Compute d = e −1 (mod (p + 1)(q + 1)). 
The complexity of the encryption and decryption algorithms are based on the size of the encryption key e and the size of decryption key d, respectively. In a cryptosystem with a limited resource such as a credit card, it is desirable to have a smaller value of d or e. Unfortunately, when d is too small, Pinch [20] showed that one can factor the RSA modulus N = pq if d < 1 3 N 1 4 . Using a generalized attack, Nitaj [18] showed that one can factor N when d ≡ y
x (mod (p+1)(q +1)) is much larger under some extra conditions on x and y.
A New Improved Attack Based on Continued Fractions
In this section, we give an improved attack on KMOV based totally on the continued fraction algorithm.
The new attack based on continued fractions
The attacks presented in [20] and [11] take advantage on using the convergents of the continued fraction expansion of e N . Instead of using the convergents of e N , we will use the convergents of e φ0 where φ 0 is given by φ 0 = N + 1 + 1 + 3
To this end, we will need the following result. .
Proof. Suppose that
Then, clearing the denominators, we get
which is equivalent to
This terminates the proof.
The following lemma is useful for approximating the sizes of the prime factors of an RSA modulus N = pq when p and q are of the same bit-size.
Lemma 2.
Let N = pq be an RSA modulus with q < p < 2q. Then
Proof. Assume that q < p < 2q. Then 1 < p q < √ 2, so, since the function
If we multiply by N 1 2 , we get
This terminates the proof. Now, we present our first improved attack on KMOV based on the continued fraction algorithm. The following result shows that the secret information p, q, d in a KMOV cryptosystem can be recovered from public information (e, N ). Theorem 6. Let (N, e) be a public key in a KMOV cryptosystem with N = pq > 10 6 , q < p < 2q and gcd(e, (p + 1)(q + 1)). If ed ≡ 1 (mod (p + 1)(q + 1))
√ e , then one can factor N in polynomial time in log(N ).
Proof. Suppose that N = pq with q < p < 2q. Then, by Lemma 2, we get
We set φ 1 = N +1+2N
If ed ≡ 1 (mod (p + 1)(q + 1)), then ed − k(p + 1)(q + 1) = 1, and
e((p + 1)(q + 1) − φ 0 ) φ 0 (p + 1)(q + 1) + e (p + 1)(q + 1)(k(p + 1)(q + 1) + 1) .
Since φ 0 (p + 1)(q + 1) > φ 2 1 and (p + 1)(q + 1)(k(p + 1)(q + 1) + 1) > φ 2 1 , then
Then, combining (3) and
Using Lemma 1, for N > 10 6 , we get
. Now, suppose that e
It follows by Theorem 4 that k d is a convergent of e φ0 from which we deduce k and d. Using the equation ed − k(p + 1)(q + 1) = 1, we get p + q = ed−1 k − N − 1 and combining with N = pq, we easily find p and q. This gives to the factorization of N = pq. Notice that, since the continued fraction algorithm works in polynomial time, then finding p and q is done in polynomial time.
Comparison with former attacks
In [20] , Pinch extended Wiener's attack [25] on RSA to KMOV and showed that one can factor the modulus N = pq if the private exponent d satisfies d < We notice that k d is not among the convergents of e N which implies that the methods of Pinch and Ibrahimpasic will not succeed.
A New Improved Attack Based on Coppersmith's Method
In this section, we present a new attack on KMOV based on Coppersmith's method.
The new attack
Theorem 7. Let (N, e) be a public key for the KMOV cryptosystem where N = pq is an RSA modulus and e = N β . Suppose that e satisfies the equation eu − (p + 1)(q + 1)v = w with u < N δ and |w| < N γ . If
for a small positive constant ε, then one can factor N in polynomial time.
Proof. Suppose that N = pq is an RSA modulus and e is a public exponent satisfying eu − (p + 1)(q + 1)v = w. Since (p + 1)(q + 1) = N + p + q + 1, then v(N +p+q+1)+w ≡ 0 (mod e), which can be rewritten as v(p+q+1)+N v+w ≡ 0 (mod e). Consider the polynomial f (x, y, z) = xy + N x + z, Then (x, y, z) = (v, p + q + 1, w) is a solution of the modular polynomial equation f (x, y, z) ≡ 0 (mod e). To find the solution (v, p+q+1, w), we apply Coppersmith's method [8] . Let m and t be two positive integers to be optimized later. We use f (x, y, z) to build the sets of polynomials
for k = 0, . . . m, i 1 = k, i 2 = k + 1, . . . , i 1 + t, i 3 = m − i 1 .
Let L denote the lattice spanned by the coefficient vectors of the polynomials G k,i1,i2,i3 (Xx, Y y, Zz) and H k,i1,i2,i3 (Xx, Y y, Zz). By choosing the increasing ordering following the i 1 's, then the i 2 's, and the i 3 's, one find a left triangular matrix. For m = 2 and t = 1, the coefficient matrix for L is presented in Table 1 where the monomials are {z 3 , xz 2 , x 2 z, x 3 , xyz 2 , x 2 yz, x 3 y, x 2 y 2 z, x 3 y 2 , x 3 y 3 , xy 2 z 2 , x 2 y 3 z, x 2 yz, x 3 y 4 }.
The non-zero elements are marked with an ' ' and do not influence the value of the determinant. The determinant of the triangular matrix is then the determinant of the lattice L and can be easily computed as
To find the values of the exponents n e , n X , n Y , n Z , define the sum S(a) by 
The dimension of the lattice is the number of rows in the matrix. It can be estimated as
If we set t = τ m for some positive τ , then the dominant terms of the exponents in (5) and 6 are
Next, we apply the LLL algorithm 2 to the lattice L. We then get a reduced basis where the three first vectors h i , i = 1, 2, 3 satisfy
To apply Howgrave-Graham's Theorem 1 to h 1 , h 2 and h 3 , we set 2 ω(ω−1)
Using (4), we get
Suppose that e = N β , u < N δ and |w| < N γ . Then, using Lemma 2, we
On the other hand, since (p + 1)(q + 1) > N and |w| < eu, we get
Since v is represented by x, we set X = 2N β+δ−1 . Also, since w is represented by Z, we set Z = N γ . It follows that the solution (x, y, z) = (v, p + q + 1, w) satisfies |x| < X, |y| < Y and |z| < Z and (8) is satisfied if
Using the approximations of n e , n X , n Y , n Z given in (7) and ω given 6, the inequality 8 leads to
To homogenize the exponentiation of N , we set
where µ is a small positive constant. Then, taking logarithms and dividing by m 3 log N , we get (3τ + 2)β + (3τ + 2)(β + δ − 1) + 3τ 2 + 3τ + 1 2
The optimal value for the left hand side is τ 0 = 1−2δ−2γ 2 , which, plugged in the former inequality leads to
where ε is a small positive constant that depends on m and N . Within this condition, the reduced lattice has three polynomials h 1 (x, y, z), h 2 (x, y, z) and h 2 (x, y, z) sharing the root (x 0 , y 0 , z 0 ) = (v, p+q+1, w). Then, applying Gröbner basis or resultant computations, we get the expected solution (x 0 , y 0 , z 0 ) from which we deduce p + q = y − 1. Together with the equation pq = N , this leads to finding p and q. This terminates the proof.
Comparison with former attacks
In [18] , Nitaj presented an algorithm for factoring the modulus N = pq when the public exponent e satisfies an equation of the form eu − (p + 1)(q + 1)v = w, where the unknown parameters u, v and w are such that
The idea in [18] is to compute the convergents of the continued fraction of e N , and for each convergent v u with uv < . If so, then by applying Coppersmith's method, one can find p, and then factor N .
To compare our new results and the result of [18] , suppose that e = N β , u < N δ and |w| < N γ . Then, by (9), we get |v| < 2N β+δ−1 . Hence, the inequalities (12) are fulfilled if
Then, neglecting the constants and assuming that p − q ≈ p + q, the former two inequalities are true if A typical situation is when e ≈ N , that is β = 1, and |w| is small, that is γ = 0. Then the bounds δ 0 and δ 1 are δ 0 = 0.25, δ 1 ≈ 0.284. We see that the new method overcome the method of [18] in the most realistic situations of instances of KMOV.
Conclusion
We have presented two new attacks on the KMOV cryptosystem which is an RSA type cryptosystem based on elliptic curves. The first attack is based on the continued fraction algorithm and the second is based on Coppersmith's method. Both attacks work when the private key is suitably small and the new results improve the former attacks on the KMOV elliptic curve cryptosystem.
